RADIO VENEZUELA — Military & Regime Communications Intelligence

The HF Radio Backbone
The Satellite Is Dead
Ground Stations Inside Military Bases
Air Defense — The Paper Tiger
The Five-Country Intelligence Pipeline
Operation Absolute Resolve — Cyber Dimension
Exposed Infrastructure
Starlink — The Regime's Nightmare
Naval Order of Battle 2026
Key Findings

1. The HF Radio Backbone

Venezuela's military runs on High Frequency radio. Not as a backup — as the backbone.

The Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (FANB) operates across six military regions, each with a Regional Command Center (CRC). Long-range command and control between these regions uses HF bands (3–30 MHz) with Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) — a protocol that automatically selects the best frequency, identifies stations by call sign, and logs every connection attempt.

What I documented:

45+ Army HF frequencies across 5 infantry divisions + General Staff
70+ Navy HF frequencies covering all maritime operations
50+ Army ALE identifiers mapped to specific units, bases, and command elements
80+ Navy ALE identifiers including individual ship call signs for 25+ vessels
4 documented ALE networks — Riverine HQ, Riverine Forces, Coast Guard, Riverine Ops
3 cross-branch shared frequencies — Army, Navy, and National Guard on the same channels

Those three shared frequencies are the critical finding. Army, Navy, and National Guard all communicate on them. Monitor one branch, hear all three.

Cross-Branch Shared Frequencies

Frequency (kHz)	Branches	Mode
7849.0	Army, Navy, National Guard	USB/LSB
10272.0	Army, Navy, National Guard	USB
10600.0	Army, Navy, National Guard	USB

Army HF Frequencies (USB/ALE)

Unit	Frequencies (kHz)
General Staff / C2	7849.0, 8060.0, 9795.0, 10600.0, 11155.0, 12191.0, 13449.0
General Profile	7516.0, 7849.0, 8060.0, 8181.0, 10600.0, 11601.0, 12161.0, 14569.0
1st Infantry Division	8184.0, 8260.0, 11625.0, 12191.0, 13500.0
2nd Infantry Division	5760.0, 6870.0, 7597.0, 8060.0, 8187.0, 9052.0, 9232.0, 10156.0, 11610.0, 13449.0
3rd Infantry Division	7597.0, 8050.0, 9232.0, 9259.0, 10150.0, 12191.0, 13464.0, 13506.0
4th Infantry Division	9795.0, 12185.0, 13455.0
5th Infantry Division	5406.0, 6786.0, 7399.0, 9233.0, 9906.0, 10115.0, 12191.0, 14569.0

Army ALE Address Identifiers (50+)

Call Sign	Unit / Function
CGE	Army Headquarters (Cuartel General de Ejercito)
CGEJM	Army Mobile HQs
CLC	Local Communications Center
CLC22M	Mobile Command Post, 22nd Infantry Brigade
CLC23M	Mobile Command Post, 23rd Special Operations Brigade
CLC51	51st Jungle Infantry Brigade
CLM	Maintenance Logistics Center
CRC	Regional Command Center
CCM	Mobile Command Center
C5F	Civil Affairs (Asuntos Civiles)
CUFAN	Unified Command of National Armed Forces
CUFAN1	Personnel Division
CUFAN2	Intelligence Division
CUFAN3	Operations Division
CUFAN4	Logistics Division
CUFAN5	Civil Affairs Division
CUFAN6	Command & Control Division
MIRA1	Presidential Palace (Miraflores) — Military Command Element
MIRA2	Presidential Palace — Military Command Element
MIRA3	Presidential Palace — Military Command Element
PCRC	Regional Command Post Communications
PCRM	Regional Command Post Mobile
PNME	Riverine Forces River Post
PORLAMAR	Destacamento de Apoyo Aéreo #7
RESERVA1-10	Infantry/Armor Battalion Reserves
SCLC	Subordinate Local Communications Center
SCLC222M	Mobile Command Post, 222nd Infantry Battalion
SCLC512	512th Jungle Infantry Battalion
SCLM	Maintenance Logistics Service Center

Navy HF Frequencies (70+)

All Navy frequencies (kHz): 4390.0L, 4632.0U, 5439.0L, 6248.0L, 6260.0L, 6265.0L, 6335.0L, 6357.0L, 6360.0L, 6880.0L, 6888.0L, 6890.0U, 6894.0L, 6895.0U, 7849.0U/L, 8060.0L, 8260.0L, 8270.0L, 8280.0L, 8285.0L, 8291.0L, 8297.0L, 8340.0L, 8358.0L, 8500.0L, 8525.0L, 8540.0L, 8582.0L, 8810.0L, 8825.0U/L, 9017.0L, 9070.0L, 9075.0L, 9190.0U, 9350.0L, 9355.0L, 9380.0L, 9390.0L, 9400.0L, 10272.0U, 10590.0L, 10600.0U, 10650.0L, 12220.0L, 12479.0L, 12480.0L, 12510.0L, 12528.5L, 12537.0U, 12546.0L, 12600.0L, 12660.0L, 13139.0L, 13500.0U, 14759.0L, 14790.0L, 14911.0L, 15536.5U, 16458.0L, 16680.0L, 17080.0L, 17380.0L, 19098.0L, 19200.0U, 20400.0L, 22245.0L

(U = USB, L = LSB)

Navy ALE Networks

Frequency	Network	Key Stations
7310.0 USB	Riverine HQ Network	Base Naval Ciudad Bolívar; Addresses 0-4 (Floating Posts & Patrol Launches)
8280.0 LSB	Riverine Forces	COFFMU1 (Comando Fluvial Fronterizo); DIV (Naval Infantry Command, Vargas)
10650.0 LSB	Coast Guard	DCCOP (Central Ops, Caracas); GC12 (ARBV General Morán); T64 (LSM Los Llanos)
20400.0 LSB	Riverine Ops	ABC Riverine HQ; DIVIMCO1 (Marine Infantry); PNEN1 (Orinoco-Apure Axis)

Naval Vessel ALE Call Signs

Hull #	Vessel Name	ALE Call Sign(s)	Type
F-21	Mariscal Sucre	5JL1, SUCRE	Frigate
F-22	Almirante Brión	BRION	Frigate
F-24	General Soublette	1C3Z, 5JL1, T5L1, SOUBLETTE	Frigate
T-61	Capana	1W1S, CAPANA	LST
T-62	Esequibo	4T8S, ESQUIBO	LST
T-63	Goijaira	2TB9	LST
T-64	Los Llanos	3V2Y, 8DV9, LLANOS	LST
T-72	La Orchila	6QA8	Support
T-81	Supply Ship	9AH4	Supply
BE-11	Simón Bolívar	BOLIVAR	Training
PC-11	Constitución	CONSTITUCION, PC11	Patrol
PC-12	Federación	FEDERACION, PC12	Patrol
PC-13	Independencia	INDEPENDENCIA, PC13	Patrol
PC-14	Libertad	LIBERTAD	Patrol
PC-16	Víctor	VICTOR, PC16	Patrol
GC-11	Almirante Clemente	CLEMENTE, GC11	Coast Guard
GC-12	Gral. Trinidad Morán	GC12, MORAN	Coast Guard
GC-21	Guaicamacuto	—	Coast Guard
B-8424	Río Negro	NEGRON	Patrol

Navy Command ALE Identifiers (80+)

Command & HQ: ADIPC, ARMARIO, BDIRCO, BNA, BNARAB, BNARCO, BNARTEL, BNF, BNFACO, BNG, BNGU, BRIFFR, BRIFFRI5, CANCO, CANES, CEDAOR, CEDCOM, CEDCOMEBA, CEDCOMEF, CEDEFCOP, CEDLO, CEDOP, CEDOPGR, CEOFAB, CEOFL, CFLCO, CGA, CGA3, CGACO, CGARM, CGUARD, CGUARDOP, CNZACE, CNZEDOP, COFFRI1, COFL, COMEDRA, CUMANA, CZNACEN, DCCOP, DHN, DICO, DIVIMBO, DIVIMCO1, EGR, EPAR, EPG, EPGLG, EPN, ESGN, ESOAR, ETAR, FALCON, JCCOP, OCAMAR

Riverine Posts: PNFA1, PNFA3, PNFA5 (Orinoco-Apure) • PNME2-5 (Río Meta) • PNRN4-5 (Río Negro) • PNPP5 • PNEN1 (Orinoco-Apure Axis)

Radio Stations: PR1, PR2, PR4, PR5

Zone IDs: ZNACEN, ZNAOR, VARGAS

Air Force Bases (9 with GPS)

Base	Location	Coordinates
LT Vicente Landaeta Gil AB	Barquisimeto	10°02'33.50"N 069°21'30.80"W
Luis del Valle García AB	Barcelona	10°06'25.70"N 064°41'20.98"W
Base Aérea Mariscal Sucre	Boca del Río	10°14'59.92"N 067°38'57.91"W
Francisco de Miranda AB	Caracas/La Carlota	10°29'06.12"N 066°50'36.66"W
Rafael Urdaneta AB	Maracaibo	10°33'29.55"N 071°43'40.28"W
El Libertador AB	Maracay/Palo Negro	10°11'00.15"N 067°33'26.35"W
Gral. José Antonio Páez AB	Puerto Ayacucho	05°37'11.97"N 067°36'21.97"W
Santo Domingo FAB	Santo Domingo	07°33'54.40"N 072°02'06.45"W
San Antonio del Táchira FAB	San Antonio	07°51'08.75"N 072°26'05.76"W

Aeronautical Frequencies

Category	Frequencies
Caracas/Maiquetía VHF	118.1, 118.4, 119.3, 119.5, 120.4, 121.7, 121.9 MHz • VOR: 114.8 MHz
HF Aeronautical	3010, 6643, 8924, 11345, 17937, 21976 kHz
Caribbean VOLMET	2950, 5580, 11315 kHz

Naval Bases

Base	Location	Assets	Type
Puerto Cabello ("Armario")	Carabobo	Frigate Squadron (F-21, F-22, F-24, F-26), Amphibious Squadron	MAJOR
Punto Fijo	Falcón	Patrol Squadron (PC-11 through PC-16)	MAJOR
La Guaira	Vargas	Coast Guard (GC-11, GC-12)	MAJOR
Caracas	Caracas	—	Major
Maracaibo	Zulia	—	Minor
Ciudad Bolívar	Bolívar	Riverine HQ	Minor
El Amparo	Apure	—	Minor
Turiamo	Aragua	—	Naval Airbase
Puerto Hierro	Sucre	—	Naval Airbase
La Orchila	Island	—	Naval Airbase

The ALE identifiers are equally valuable. Each call sign maps to a specific unit or vessel. When "DIVSUP" connects to "REGCOM3" on 8060.0 kHz, you know the Division of Supply is contacting Regional Command 3. When "PCGFLU" transmits, that's a Coast Guard river patrol. When "FRALUI" calls in, that's the frigate Almirante Brión.

Every one of these frequencies is monitorable with consumer-grade equipment. An SDR dongle, a wire antenna, and a laptop anywhere in the Caribbean can intercept HF communications across the entire Venezuelan military.

2. The Satellite Is Dead

VeneSat-1, the Simón Bolívar satellite, was Venezuela's crown jewel — a $390 million Chinese-built communications satellite launched October 2008 from Xichang, China. It carried 28 transponders: 14 C-band, 12 Ku-band, and 2 Ka-band (exclusive to Venezuelan territory).

Band	Count	Downlink (MHz)	Uplink (MHz)	Coverage
C-band	14	3,700–4,200	5,925–6,425	Caribbean + South America
Ku-band	12	11,280–11,700	14,080–14,500	Cuba, DR, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay
Ka-band	2	19,000–19,300	28,800–29,100	Venezuela Only

Death Timeline

February 2020: First solar array drive mechanism failed
March 2020: Second solar array drive failed — total power loss
March 13, 2020: Satellite declared out of service, tumbling uncontrolled
March 25, 2020: Ministry of Science officially declared satellite lost
Current state: Tumbling in elliptical orbit ~50 km above GEO — SPACE DEBRIS

March 24, 2020 at 13:13 EST: Venezuelan government transferred broadcasting to American Intelsat 14 (45°W, C-band). VTV, TVes, Telesur, Vive TV, Radio Nacional, and Miraflores FM — the presidential palace radio station — all migrated to an American satellite.

An anti-American regime broadcasting its propaganda through American satellite infrastructure.

VeneSat-1 Technical Details

Parameter	Value
Known active transponder (pre-death)	3886 MHz, vertical polarization, SR 23000
Beacon frequency	11700V
FTA Venezuela (active)	Intelsat 35e, 34.5°W, 11110 MHz, DVB-S2
State media (active)	Intelsat 14, 45°W, C-band
Manufacturer	China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), DFH-4 bus
Contractor	China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC)
Cost	$240M (manufacture/launch) + $150M (ground) = $390M total
Mass	~5,050 kg
Orbital slot	78°W (ceded by Uruguay)

What was NOT transferred: Ku-band military internet (CANTV Satelital broadband for military, health, education, electoral council, security). Ka-band Venezuela-exclusive transponders — permanently lost. Venezuela's military lost satellite communications entirely.

3. Ground Stations Inside Military Bases

Venezuela operates two satellite ground stations, both built by China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and handed over December 1, 2008.

Station	Location	Role	Status
Baemari / El Sombrero	Base Aérea Militar Capitán Manuel Ríos, Guárico state 9.3563°N, 66.9131°W	Primary satellite control + teleport	PRIMARY
Luepa	Fort Manikuyá, Bolívar state	Backup control station	BACKUP

Chinese access concern: China built the entire Operations Management System. Chinese personnel trained all Venezuelan technicians. According to the Washington Post, China may retain remote access even without physical presence. The House Select Committee on China flagged these as having "dual-use military applications."

4. Air Defense — The Paper Tiger

Venezuela's Integrated Air Defense System (SINODAM/SINDA) is a multi-layered network of Chinese radars and Russian surface-to-air missiles:

System	Type	Origin	Jan 2026 Status
JY-27A	Long-range surveillance radar (12+)	China (CETC)	JAMMED
S-300VM	Long-range SAM	Russia	NOT CONNECTED
BUK M-2	Medium-range SAM	Russia	NOT CONNECTED
FK-3	Medium-range SAM	China	FAILED
Pantsir-S1	Short-range point defense	Russia	FAILED
S-125 Pechora	Legacy SAM	Russia	OBSOLETE

January 3, 2026: Every single layer failed. US Navy EA-18G Growlers deployed electronic attack that blinded every Chinese radar. The S-300VM and BUK M-2 batteries weren't even connected to their engagement radars. Anti-radiation missiles destroyed emitters that attempted to activate.

Billions in Russian and Chinese air defense equipment. Defeated by electronic warfare aircraft.

5. The Five-Country Intelligence Pipeline

CHINA
Tech & Radars

→

CUBA
SIGINT Analysis

→

VENEZUELA
Enforcement

←

RUSSIA
Modernization

←

IRAN
Manufacturing

China provides JY-27A radars (CETC), CANTV telecom backbone (ZTE/Huawei), CEIEC "Great Firewall" deep packet inspection, facial recognition for SEBIN, and the Sistema Patria surveillance database.
Cuba runs ~500 military advisors in Venezuela. SIGINT stations at Lourdes and Bejucal near Havana monitor the Caribbean with triangulation over thousands of kilometers. Data flows to correlation centers in Havana. Chinese radar feeds from SINDA are shared with Cuba.
Venezuela enforces domestically through DGCIM (military counterintelligence — intercepts calls, SMS, email, deploys malware) and SEBIN (Helicoide complex + La Tumba underground detention).
Russia modernizes Cuban surveillance infrastructure and provides Venezuela with secure comms gear, electronic warfare equipment, and S-300VM systems.
Iran manufactures fiber optic cable through Venefibra ($10M factory in Catia la Mar) and supplies Peykaap III fast attack craft with Nasr anti-ship missiles.

Physical backbone: ALBA-1, a 1,630 km submarine fiber optic cable running directly from La Guaira, Venezuela to Siboney, Cuba. Owned by Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe (60% Venezuelan state). This is the wire carrying intelligence data to Cuban analysis centers in Havana.

G-Network — The Node That Ties It Together

Telecomunicaciones G-Network C.A. — an ISP founded 2021 in La Guaira that received its CONATEL license in 4 months (normally takes years). Deployed 28 km of fiber along the presidential highway using unmarked vans. Infrastructure runs 200–500 meters from SEBIN headquarters.

A SEBIN operative's server was discovered at 38.61.255.205:5000 on G-Network IP space, created by an active SEBIN officer on the UN-documented torture list. G-Network employs a Russian consultant from Volgograd State Technical University. Five km away, an Iranian fiber optic factory produces cable.

6. Operation Absolute Resolve — Cyber Dimension

January 3, 2026

Time	Event	Command
T-14 hours	BGP traffic redirection detected — intelligence gathering	CYBERCOM
02:00 AM	Power grid across Caracas blacked out via SCADA compromise	CYBERCOM
02:01 AM	US helicopters began landing — 1-minute cyber-to-kinetic	SOCOM
02:01+ AM	EA-18G Growlers jam all radar and communications	SPACECOM / Navy
Result	Maduro captured. Venezuelan C2 completely paralyzed.	—

What survived? HF radio. The same frequencies documented in this investigation. The 3–30 MHz bands that propagate via ionospheric skip, require no infrastructure, can't be taken down by a cyber attack, and can only be jammed within line-of-sight.

Every frequency in this document is the fallback the Venezuelan military reverts to when everything modern fails. On January 3, 2026, everything modern failed.

7. Exposed Infrastructure

CANTV Internal Architecture (from GitHub)

The Covetel cooperative published CANTV's email and portal architecture publicly on GitHub:

Exchange server: owacorp.cantv.com.ve
SOGo mail: sogo.cantv.com.ve
CMS: Plone/Zope with PostgreSQL backend
Directory: LDAP integration

CONATEL Subdomains (All Live)

Subdomain	Function	Tech
conatelenlinea.conatel.gob.ve	Online services portal	Yii PHP framework
sigestel.conatel.gob.ve	Telecom management (licensing/certification)	—
sac.conatel.gob.ve	Citizen services	—
registroeventos.conatel.gob.ve	Event registration	—
habilita.conatel.gob.ve	Telecom licensing portal	Live
homologa.conatel.gob.ve	Equipment certification	502 Bad Gateway

SEBIN Infrastructure on G-Network

Item	Detail
SEBIN Server	38.61.255.205:5000 — Flask/Python login portal on G-Network IP space (ASN 272122)
Created by	Detective Javier Ochoa — active SEBIN officer, UN torture list (17 officers)
G-Network Fiber	28 km along Caracas-La Guaira presidential highway, deployed with unmarked vans
Proximity	G-Network infrastructure 200–500m from SEBIN HQ (Plaza Venezuela)
Russian Consultant	Vadim Sidorov (Volgograd State Technical University) employed at G-Network
Iranian Factory	Venefibra fiber optic factory, 5 km from G-Network, $10M, operational Aug 2025
CONATEL License	Obtained in 4 months (normally takes years) — political connections to Governor Terán (PSUV)

Hytera TETRA Police Radios

Equipment	Type	Notes
PT580H	TETRA handheld portable	Caracas Police
MT680	TETRA mobile radio (vehicle-mounted)	Caracas Police
DIB-R5	TETRA base stations with TEDS	Redundant backup at separate locations

Vulnerability: TEA1 encryption — TETRA:BURST backdoor (discovered July 2023). Manufacturer: Hytera Communications, Shenzhen, China. Another Chinese company providing Venezuela's security communications with a documented cryptographic weakness.

Submarine Cables

Cable	Route	Length	Notes
ALBA-1	La Guaira → Siboney, Cuba → Ocho Rios, Jamaica	1,630 km	INTEL PIPELINE 60% Venezuelan state-owned
CANTV Coastal	Maracaibo to Carupáno (13 cities)	—	$80M domestic cable
ARCOS-1	24 landing points, 15 countries	8,700 km	International backbone
AMERICAS-II	USA → PR → USVI → Martinique → Curaçao → Trinidad → Venezuela → Brazil	—	International
ECFS	Eastern Caribbean to Venezuela	—	Caribbean island chain

CEIEC — China's Great Firewall for Venezuela

US Treasury/OFAC sanctioned CEIEC (China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation) in November 2020 for providing CANTV with a "commercialized version of China's Great Firewall" — deep packet inspection, keyword filtering, traffic shaping, and metadata collection. CANTV controls ~70% of Venezuela's internet.

Censorship hierarchy: CEIEC (China) → CANTV (state) → CONATEL (regulator) → Private ISPs

Chinese Infrastructure Penetration

Huawei: 1,400+ workers in Venezuela (400 Chinese), fiber optic network, military DICOFAN work, 5G
ZTE: Sistema Patria surveillance, CANTV infrastructure, communication antennas, Vtelca joint venture
Both companies have knowledge of "significant portions of the communications, data, and command and control architectures"

CEOFANB Website (Probed March 2026)

ceofanb.mil.ve — WordPress + nginx, WordFence security
REST API: locked (rest_login_required — 401)
XML-RPC: blocked (403 Forbidden)
Google Analytics: UA-105348112-1
Internal email: correo.ceofanb.mil.ve (unreachable externally)

8. Starlink — The Regime's Nightmare

Starlink does not officially serve Venezuela — one of the only Latin American countries dark on the coverage map. But terminals are smuggled from Colombia and Argentina, selling on Telegram for $60–$600+.

Within 48 hours of Operation Absolute Resolve, Starlink offered free internet to all Venezuelans.

They can't block it. They can't jam it from the ground. They can't intercept it. They can't shut it down. CEIEC's Great Firewall is useless against it. CONATEL's censorship orders don't reach space.

For a regime that built its entire surveillance apparatus around controlling the wire, a communications system that doesn't use the wire is an existential threat.

9. Naval Order of Battle 2026

Category	Class	Count	Notes
Submarines	Type 209/1300	2	NON-OPERATIONAL
Submarines	VAS 525 mini-sub	1	Active
Frigates	Almirante Brion	1	Missile frigate
Patrol	Gavión-class	12	—
Patrol	Point-class	4	—
Patrol	Págalo-class	2	—
Patrol	Guaicamacuto-class	3	—
Fast Attack	Peykaap III	Multiple	IRANIAN-MADE Nasr missiles
Amphibious	Capana-class LST	4	Landing ships
Coastal	Constitución-class	3	Gunboats
Support	Various	7	Tug, supply, oceanographic
Training	Simón Bolívar	1	Sail training

Iranian Peykaap III Fast Attack Craft — Full Specifications

Parameter	Value
Origin	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGC-N), North Korean-derived hull
Length	17.3m (56 ft 9 in)
Beam	3.75m
Draft	0.7m
Displacement	~13.75 tons
Speed	50+ knots
Crew	3
Armament	2× Nasr anti-ship missile launchers + machine guns
Nasr Missile	Iranian copy of Chinese C-704, TV + mmWave radar guidance
Range	35 km (export CM-90 variant: 90 km)
Tactics	High-speed swarm attacks in confined maritime environments

The weapons pipeline mirrors the telecom pipeline — Iran manufactures, China designs, Venezuela deploys. Shown in Venezuelan naval parade July 2023, deployed in Caribbean waters.

Submarine Communications Gap

Venezuela has NO ELF/VLF submarine communication infrastructure. Only the US, Russia, India, and China operate ELF facilities. The two Type 209/1300 submarines (Sábalo and Caribe) are reportedly non-operational — haven't been to sea in years. Even if operational, submerged they would be completely cut off from command. Surfaced comms would use Navy HF frequencies listed above.

ALBA-1 Submarine Cable — Intelligence Pipeline

Parameter	Detail
Length	1,630 km
Route	La Guaira, Venezuela → Siboney, Cuba (direct)
Owner	Telecomunicaciones Gran Caribe (60% Venezuelan state, 40% Cuba's Transbit)
Function	Physical backbone of Venezuela-Cuba intelligence data transfer
Chinese radar feeds	SINODAM/SINDA data shared with Cuban SIGINT via this cable
Status during Op Absolute Resolve	Unknown if disrupted

10. Key Findings

1 Everything is Chinese.

The telecom backbone (CANTV), radar systems (JY-27A), missile systems (FK-3), surveillance systems (Sistema Patria), and the national satellite (VeneSat-1) — all built by ZTE, Huawei, or CETC. China has knowledge of Venezuela's entire C2 architecture.

2 HF radio is the backbone — and the only thing that survived.

130+ frequencies with ALE across 6 military regions. When CYBERCOM killed the power grid and Growlers jammed the radars on January 3, HF was the only C2 channel still functioning. Every frequency is monitorable with a $30 SDR.

3 Cross-branch sharing exposes the entire network.

Army, Navy, and National Guard share at least 3 frequencies (7849.0, 10272.0, 10600.0 kHz). Monitor one branch, hear all three.

4 Air defense is a paper tiger.

The January 2026 operation proved every Chinese radar and Russian SAM failed. BUK and S-300VM weren't even connected to radars during the attack.

5 The satellite is dead — they depend on American infrastructure.

VeneSat-1 ($390M) died March 2020. State media broadcasts via American Intelsat 14 and 35e. Military Ku-band internet was never replaced. Ka-band transponders permanently lost.

6 Five-country intelligence pipeline fully mapped.

China → Cuba → Venezuela ← Russia ← Iran. ALBA-1 submarine cable (1,630 km, La Guaira to Siboney) is the physical backbone. Chinese radar feeds shared with Havana SIGINT stations.

7 Ground stations inside military bases with Chinese remote access.

Baemari primary station at 9.3563°N, 66.9131°W — inside Capitán Manuel Ríos Military Airbase. China built it, may still access it remotely. House Select Committee flagged "dual-use military applications."

8 China-Russia-Iran-SEBIN convergence in telecom.

G-Network ISP hosts SEBIN server (38.61.255.205:5000), employs a Russian consultant, and sits 5 km from an Iranian fiber optic factory. Four authoritarian actors, one telecom infrastructure.

9 DGCIM has full intercept capability with Cuban advisors.

Monitors hundreds of military personnel simultaneously. Intercepts calls, SMS, email, social media. Deploys malware. Cuban advisors provide "enhanced interrogation training." A Navy captain died in custody.

10 Police radios have a known Chinese backdoor.

Caracas police use Hytera TETRA radios (Shenzhen, China). TEA1 encryption has the TETRA:BURST backdoor (July 2023). The weapons pipeline mirrors the telecom pipeline.

11 CANTV infrastructure exposed on GitHub.

Covetel cooperative published CANTV's Exchange server, SOGo mail, PostgreSQL, Plone/Zope CMS, and LDAP directory publicly. Six live CONATEL subdomains discovered.

12 Starlink is the regime's nightmare.

Can't block it, can't jam it, can't intercept it. Free service offered post-operation. For a regime built on controlling the wire, a system that doesn't use the wire is existential.

Read the full narrative investigation on Substack.

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